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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
Wayfair: Substantial Nexus and Undue Burden
by Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske, and David Gamage
The U.S. Supreme Court decided South Dakota 
v. Wayfair and overruled its physical presence rule
in a 5-4 decision.1 The Court’s ruling was very 
narrow, though, holding only that the physical 
presence rule is no longer the governing standard 
for purposes of determining when a taxpayer has 
the substantial nexus required under the Court’s 
Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady formulation.2 
That limited holding leaves many questions 
unanswered.
This is the first in a series of planned articles 
that will evaluate the Court’s opinion and discuss 
some of the questions raised by that opinion. In 
this article, we tackle some of the more immediate 
interpretive questions raised by the Wayfair 
opinion, such as how a state should approach 
substantial nexus. In future articles, we will 
consider additional unsettled issues, such as what 
Wayfair says about the Court’s perspective on 
federalism.
As part of our analysis of the Wayfair opinion, 
we offer advice to state governments. In this 
article, we recommend that states take note of the 
features of South Dakota’s law that appealed to 
the Court and replicate or improve on these to the 
extent possible. We advise states to consider 
simplifying their sales tax systems (and 
potentially joining the Streamlined Sales and Use 
Tax Agreement if they have not already done so), 
offering full and adequate reimbursement for 
compliance costs (especially for smaller vendors), 
and offering free compliance software and 
immunity for vendors who properly rely on such 
software.
The Opinion
The majority opinion in Wayfair was written 
by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who invited the 
case three years earlier in his concurring opinion 
in DMA v. Brohl.3 Kennedy started the majority 
opinion with a review of the development of the 
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In this edition of 
Academic Perspectives on SALT, the authors 
begin a series of articles aimed at evaluating the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in South Dakota v. 
Wayfair. The first article in this series tackles 
some of the more immediate interpretive 
questions raised by the Wayfair opinion, such as 
how a state should approach substantial nexus.
1
No. 17-494, 2018 WL 3058015 (2018).
2
430 U.S. 274 (1977).
3
135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134-35 (2015) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
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Court’s dormant commerce clause doctrine since 
the 1800s and noted that the Court’s tax-specific 
precedents had been animated by its approach in 
its regulatory cases. The opinion started with a 
clear statement regarding the majority’s view of 
the merit of the physical presence rule, calling the 
rule “flawed on its own terms.”4 The opinion 
further stated that it was not a “necessary 
interpretation” of the substantial nexus 
requirement, created market distortions rather 
than preventing them, and was “the sort of 
arbitrary, formalistic [rule] that the Court’s 
modern commerce clause precedents disavow.”5
The Court recognized that the nexus 
requirement was akin to the due process 
minimum contacts requirement and said that 
although the two “may not be identical or 
coterminous . . . there are significant parallels.”6 
Incorporating the Court’s due process analysis in 
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, the Court plainly 
stated that “physical presence is not necessary to 
create a substantial nexus.”7 With that, Quill was 
dead.
The remainder of the Court’s opinion focused 
on justifying the decision. The Court discussed 
the distortionary impact of the physical presence 
rule, its move away from formalism in dormant 
commerce clause jurisprudence, the poor fit of a 
physical presence rule in the modern economy, 
the rule’s impact on states and our federal 
structure, and why stare decisis did not compel 
upholding Quill.
The Court addressed the concern that 
removing the physical presence rule would result 
in the imposition of undue compliance burdens 
on vendors engaging in interstate commerce, 
calling them “legitimate concerns.”8 The Court 
did not think that those concerns merited 
retaining the physical presence rule, though, 
pointing to the availability of software and 
congressional intervention “if it deems it 
necessary and fit to do so.”9 The Court noted that 
South Dakota’s law provided a “reasonable 
degree of protection” for smaller 
vendors,10 pointing to the law’s sales and 
transaction thresholds, prospective application, 
and the state’s membership in the SSUTA. It also 
referenced other potential avenues for smaller 
vendors to get relief from state laws that 
overreach using “other theories,” including the 
potential application of its balancing test 
established in Pike v. Bruce Church Inc. — 
something two of us have argued for in other 
forums.11
The concluding section of the majority 
opinion gave some insight into the future of the 
nexus requirement, but not much. The Court 
seems to have offered a new standard for nexus, 
or at least formulation of the standard, stating, 
“Nexus is established when the taxpayer [or 
collector] ‘avails itself of the substantial privilege 
of carrying on business’ in that jurisdiction.”12 The 
Court cited Polar Tankers Inc. v. City of Valdez13 for 
that proposition. However, Polar Tankers involved 
a local personal property tax that was struck 
down as violating the tonnage clause, and does 
not provide much guidance, especially because 
the case involved ships that were undeniably 
present in the taxing jurisdiction.
The Court’s application of its nexus standard, 
whatever the formulation, was terse. The Court 
simply stated that “here, the nexus is clearly 
sufficient based on both the economic and virtual 
contacts respondents have with the State.”14 The 
Court found that South Dakota’s economic 
thresholds ensured that affected vendors had the 
requisite economic contacts, and it noted that 
respondents were “large, national companies that 
undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual 
presence.”15 Those conclusions were enough for 
the majority to determine the substantial nexus 
requirement was met on the facts presented.
4
Wayfair, 2018 WL 3058015 at *2.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 10.
7
Id. See also 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
8
Id. at 16.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
397 U.S. 137 (1970). See also Adam Thimmesch, “A Unifying 
Approach to Nexus Under the Dormant Commerce Clause,” Mich. L. 
Rev. Online (2018), at 101; and brief of four senators in support of 
petitioner, South Dakota v. Wayfair, 2018 WL 3058015 (2018).
12
Wayfair, 2018 WL 3058015 at *17.
13
557 U.S. 1 (2009).
14
Wayfair, 2018 WL 3058015 at *17.
15
Id.
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The Court took care to point out that “some 
other principle in the Court’s commerce clause 
doctrine might invalidate” the South Dakota law, 
but it declined to opine on that issue because it 
had “not been litigated or briefed.”16 The Court 
did, however, again note that South Dakota’s law 
had “several features that appear designed to 
prevent discrimination against or undue burdens 
upon interstate commerce.”17 Those features 
included (1) de minimis safe harbor; (2) 
prospectivity; and (3) South Dakota’s adoption of 
the SSUTA, which brings with it reduced 
administrative and compliance costs for vendors.
Other Opinions
Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by 
Justices Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Samuel A. Alito Jr., and Neil M. Gorsuch. Both 
Thomas and Gorsuch penned concurring 
opinions, with Thomas repeating his standard 
objection to the Court’s entire dormant commerce 
clause doctrine18 and Gorsuch expressing 
reservation with it but noting that his broader 
concerns were “questions for another day.”19
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. wrote a 
dissent, which Justices Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia 
Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined.20 That 
opinion did not defend the physical presence rule 
— indeed, it called National Bellas Hess Inc. v. 
Department of Revenue “wrongly decided” — but 
reasoned that any change to that rule should be 
done by Congress given the potentially immense 
economic consequences.21 The chief justice argued 
that the principle of stare decisis should apply 
forcefully in the case, and the Court should retain 
Quill on that basis.
Unresolved Questions
The majority opinion in Wayfair did one thing 
very clearly — it eliminated the physical presence 
rule as the relevant test for determining when a 
taxpayer (or tax collector) has a substantial nexus 
within the Complete Auto framework. Beyond that 
limited holding, the Court’s opinion did little else, 
which leaves a lot of questions for states, vendors, 
and those interested in state tax policy.
Question 1: What Constitutes Substantial Nexus?
The first major question, from both doctrinal 
and practical perspectives, is what nexus 
standard applies post-Wayfair. The Court offered 
two threads from which to draw guidance. The 
first was its citation to Polar Tankers and its 
statement that nexus is created when one “avails 
itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on 
business” in a jurisdiction. That standard, though, 
does not appear to require much, and could be 
construed as coterminous with a due process, 
purposeful availment standard.
The second hint of a nexus standard was the 
Court’s reference to “economic and virtual 
contacts.” The key paragraph is as follows:
Here, the nexus is clearly sufficient based 
on both the economic and virtual contacts 
respondents have with the State. The Act 
applies only to sellers that deliver more 
than $100,000 of goods or services into 
South Dakota or engage in 200 or more 
separate transactions for the delivery of 
goods and services into the State on an 
annual basis. S.B. 106, section 1. This 
quantity of business could not have 
occurred unless the seller availed itself of 
the substantial privilege of carrying on 
business in South Dakota. And 
respondents are large, national companies 
that undoubtedly maintain an extensive 
virtual presence. Thus, the substantial 
nexus requirement of Complete Auto is 
satisfied in this case.
The first sentence of this paragraph suggests 
that two inquiries are relevant to nexus: (1) a 
taxpayer’s economic returns from a state; and (2) 
its activities directed toward a state.22 The second 
and third sentences of this paragraph suggest that 
the South Dakota thresholds require sufficient 16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Wayfair, 2018 WL 3058015 at *18 (Thomas, J., concurring).
19
Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
20
Id. at 18 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
21
Id. at 19-23. See also 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
22
Evaluating nexus by reference to those two factors is how state 
courts and legislatures have evaluated economic nexus for purposes of 
state corporate income taxes. See Thimmesch, “The Illusory Promise of 
Economic Nexus,” 13 Fla. Tax Rev. 157, 176-84 (2012).
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“economic contacts” for substantial nexus. The 
fourth sentence, emphasizing the size of 
respondents, focused on the so-called virtual 
contacts that large, national e-commerce vendors 
create through their extensive marketing and web 
presences.
What this paragraph does not do is address 
precisely when small sellers have substantial 
nexus. What if a small seller has exactly 200 sales, 
worth $20,000? Given this uncertainty, our advice 
for states as to nexus now would be, at a 
minimum, to put in place thresholds similar to 
South Dakota’s. Indeed, for states that want to be 
better insulated from challenges from small 
sellers, and likely at minimal revenue loss, we 
would suggest adopting higher thresholds (that 
is, thresholds more deferential to small sellers) 
than South Dakota’s. This goes especially for non-
SSUTA states.
Question 2: When Do State Statutes Unduly 
Burden Interstate Commerce?
The Court’s opinion seems to leave more room 
for vendors to challenge state impositions as 
unduly burdening interstate commerce, as 
opposed to challenging whether they have nexus 
with a state. Such a challenge would presumably 
be evaluated based on the Pike balancing test. 
Several passages from the majority opinion imply 
this, although these passages are perplexing. 
After all, Pike balancing has been previously 
understood as the backup test for economic 
regulations — not for taxes. By contrast, the 
substantial nexus test has been the first prong of 
the Complete Auto test for taxes. Of course, there is 
lots of overlap between these two tests, and, 
indeed, the Quill decision used bits of Pike 
balancing language.23 But the two tests have been 
understood as being different, and many of the 
amici who argued for Pike balancing did so 
specifically as an alternative to the Quill 
framework.24
In short, the Court could have applied a 
balancing test in the context of substantial nexus. 
Instead, the implication of the majority’s 
reasoning is that Pike balancing will be applied as 
an additional test. We do not know of a precedent 
for this. In any event, the majority opinion clearly 
left open the possibility for a Pike balancing type 
of challenge. The opinion even (helpfully) 
explained the features of South Dakota’s law that, 
if duplicated by other states, would make those 
challenges less likely to succeed. Recall that the 
Court twice referred to the fact that (1) South 
Dakota thresholds provided a small seller safe 
harbor; (2) South Dakota’s imposition applied 
prospectively only; and (3) South Dakota was an 
SSUTA state and had thus simplified its system in 
ways to reduce compliance costs for vendors. 
States that can replicate those factors should take 
comfort that their statutes are permissible. States 
that fail them might need to be more concerned.
Some discussion of the Wayfair decision seems 
to suggest that states must conform to these 
features of South Dakota’s statute before they can 
require remote vendors to collect tax. We think 
that reads far too much into the opinion. The 
Court did not make these features into 
requirements. Instead, the Wayfair decision held 
these features sufficient to insulate states from 
judicial rebuke. Furthermore, even in 
“nonconforming” states, it seems highly unlikely 
that a state statute would be overturned on Pike 
balancing absent low thresholds or retroactive 
application.25 Nevertheless, Pike is difficult to 
apply, and we think states should be wary of 
pressing the issue. Better to avoid costly litigation, 
especially when the revenue to be gained from 
smaller vendors is likely also small.
Therefore, as to Pike balancing, our advice is 
that non-SSUTA states seek to reduce compliance 
costs for out-of-state vendors the best they can. 
These states should find ways to simplify their 
sales tax systems within local constraints, offer 
vendor reimbursement for compliance costs,26 and 
consider offering free compliance software and 
immunizing vendors who rely on it.27 Again, we 
23
504 U.S. 298, 313 n.6 (1992).
24
See, e.g., brief of four U.S. senators, supra note 11.
25
We have previously written that retroactively imposed liabilities 
could violate the dormant commerce clause. See Thimmesch, Darien 
Shanske, and David Gamage, “Wayfair and the Retroactivity of 
Constitutional Holdings,” State Tax Notes, May 7, 2018, p. 511.
26
One of us discussed this first approach in a prior article: Gamage 
and Devin J. Heckman, “A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of E-
Commerce,” 92 B.U. L. Rev. 483 (2012).
27
Two of us discussed this approach in a prior article: Andrew J. 
Haile, Gamage, and Shanske, “A Potential Game Changer in E-
Commerce Taxation,” State Tax Notes, Mar. 11, 2013, p. 747.
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do not think that the Court’s opinion requires 
these actions, just that these actions would be 
legally advisable and sensible in any event, from 
a policy perspective.
Conclusion
The Court’s decision in Wayfair represents a 
substantial modernization of the Court’s 
approach to regulating state taxing jurisdiction. 
The much-maligned physical presence rule is no 
more. What now stands in its place is unclear, but 
the Court did give states several points of 
guidance. We will consider additional aspects of 
the Wayfair decision in future articles. 
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